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Abstract 
We use a modified pecking order framework to analyse financing choices for Australian 
firms. The traditional pecking order model has been extended to allow a non-linear 
relationship between a firm’s requirements for external capital (the financial deficit) and the 
amount of external debt used to meet these requirements. The pecking order theory predicts 
that firms will follow a defined hierarchy of financing choices with internal funds being used 
first, followed by external debt and as a last resort the issuance of external equity.  
 
Our main finding is that Australian firm’s do not follow the pecking order as closely as in 
other markets as the model explains less of the variation in debt issuance. Importantly, we 
find that this is not related to debt capacity constraints, which has been hypothesized by other 
researchers as a legitimate reason why firms, small firms in particular, would not appear to be 
following the pecking order theory. We use Altman’s Z-Score, which is a commonly used 
measure of financial distress, to identify firms that are relatively unconstrained in terms of 
debt capacity. We also find that while controlling for debt capacity does improve the 
explanatory power of our model, the improvement is only marginal. We do find evidence 
against the static trade-off theory of capital structure. In particular firms that are 
unconstrained in terms of debt capacity and not facing significant capital expenditure do not 
increase leverage towards an optimal capital structure in the manner predicted by the static 
trade-off theory.  
 
We hypothesize that at least part of the reason for these findings is due to taxation 
differences, with the imputation credit system in Australia effectively removing the tax 
advantage of debt for domestic investors. Another important factor that could explain the 
lower explanatory power of the pecking order model could be the more accepted use of 
warrants and rights issues to raise equity, which have been argued to have lower asymmetric 
information costs than issuing straight equity. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines capital structure theory and how it relates to a firm’s financing choices. 
There are many different theories about capital structure and despite a substantial amount of 
research there is no clear and persuasive evidence that supports one theory over another.  
Recent research has focused on combining elements from multiple theories to gain a better 
understanding on what drives financing choices.  
 
The traditional approach to capital structure has been that firms should target an optimal 
capital structure where the costs and benefits of debt financing are balanced, to maximise 
shareholder wealth. The problem with this approach is that these costs and benefits are not 
always easy to quantify and vary widely across different firm specific operating 
characteristics. In addition, there are a multitude of external factors to consider such as 
market sentiment, macroeconomic conditions as well the transaction costs of different forms 
of financing. The end result is wide cross-sectional variation in capital structures which is 
difficult to capture within a theoretical model. What is particularly difficult to understand is 
how comparable companies with similar operational characteristics make very different 
financing choices.  
 
It is relatively easy to understand the costs of debt financing, which is primarily the risk of 
financial distress or bankruptcy. Understanding credit risk is an established area of research 
and practitioners and academics alike have a good understanding of what factors are 
important for the risk profile of a firm, and how much debt a firm can support. What is far 
less clear are the benefits of debt financing. Early literature on capital structure focused on 
the benefit of debt financing from the tax deductibility of interest payments. There is little 
evidence that supports the argument that the tax advantage of debt drives capital structure 
decisions. The other major hypothesized benefit of debt relates to agency theory, where debt 
reduces agency problems by leaving fewer resources under management’s control.  
 
There are two competing theories to the optimal capital structure idea. The first is that capital 
structure is irrelevant as investors can use leverage to achieve the same results. This argument 
is only plausible if the tax and agency benefits of firm level debt are small. The second theory 
is based on transaction costs, which drives firms to choose the lowest cost instrument to raise 
finance. This is the pecking order theory which defines a hierarchy of financing preferences 
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where firms will use internal funds first followed by external debt and then external equity 
only as a last resort. External equity ranks last under this theory because new equity investors 
generally will not be prepared to pay full value for the new equity as they are at an 
informational disadvantage to managers and existing investors. New equity is always issued 
at a discount to its true value, and thus is dilutive and expensive for existing shareholders. 
Under the pecking order theory observed capital structures are simply a byproduct of past 
investment decisions. Low leverage firms have had a combination of high cash flows and/or 
low capital expenditure requirements while high leverage firms have had low cash flows 
and/or high capital expenditure requirements.  
 
However the key contribution of this research is to apply existing pecking order models and 
the extensions to Australian data. There are several characteristics of the Australian market 
that provide an interesting comparison to the US market, where most of the research has been 
done. The first obvious difference between the two markets is the existence of a full dividend 
imputation system for domestic Australian investors. This prevents double taxation of 
dividend payments at the firm and investor level which effectively removes the taxation 
advantage of debt financing. Instead of theorising about the relevance of the taxation 
advantages of debt we can observe a market where we know that the taxation advantage of 
debt is minimal. The other major difference is that Australian firms make more extensive use 
of rights issues and warrants as a source of raising equity whereas in the US this is usually 
done with a seasoned equity offering. There are arguments that not only are rights issues 
more ‘fair’ for existing shareholders  but that they have lower asymmetric information costs. 
To the extent that rights issues are more accepted by the market and less dilutive for existing 
shareholders then they are less likely to be subject to the same discount to true value as for 
seasoned equity issuance. Warrants have lower information costs because of the option 
embedded in the equity issue that gives new investors additional flexibility to evaluate 
outcomes after the issue date i.e. their informational disadvantage for new investors relative 
to existing investors and management is lower.  
 
We extend the models of (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) and (De Jong, Verbeek, & 
Verwijmeren, 2009) to a specification that includes a quadratic term to allow for a non-linear 
relationship between the financial deficit and change in debt as well as using dummy 
variables to differentiate between firms facing a financial deficit or a financial surplus. 
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2. Literature Review 
The foundation of capital structure theory is undoubtedly the seminal work of Modigliani and 
Miller in 1958 (MM). They showed that under certain assumptions the value of a firm could 
be viewed as independent of capital structure. The traditional view was that debt was always 
‘cheaper’ than equity meaning that a firm could minimise its cost of capital by using 
leverage, up until the point where extra debt would impact the operating risk of the firm and 
cause cost of equity to rise. The MM propositions changed the way people thought about 
capital structure as their framework implied a flat cost of capital curve, and at its extreme 
interpretation, no incentive to use debt at all. 
 
Following the work by MM the focus of research was on understanding the impact of tax on 
the cost of capital and the value of the interest rate tax shield1.  The ability of firms to 
increase their value by using debt to create tax shields should have resulted in firms having 
much higher levels of debt than what was actually being observed. Researchers have 
attempted to explain this “puzzle” with the increased risk of financial distress that came with 
higher levels of debt. The theory therefore was that firms attempt to balance the benefits of 
the tax shields against the costs involved with financial distress, of which the probability 
increases with increased use of debt. This is known as the static trade-off theory of capital 
structure and has become one of the dominant theories of capital structure.  
 
The pecking order predicts a hierarchy of financing preferences for different forms of 
financing. Under this theory firms will use internally generated cash flow and retained 
earnings before using external funding for new investment. If the firm requires external funds 
then the least risky sources of finance are used first. The theory has its foundations from 
research of (Donaldson, 1961) and (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The pecking order theory has 
received considerable attention in recent research on capital structure. Research by (Shyam-
Sunder & Myers, 1999) introduced a new and relatively simple model for testing the theory. 
The pecking order theory is basically a theory about the order of preference for different 
sources of funds, so their model examines how much debt is used to fulfill financing. 
(Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) also showed how traditional empirical models developed to 
test static trade-off theory did not have the statistical power to reject data generated by firms 
                                            
1
 See (Brennan & Schwartz, 1978; Deangelo & Masulis, 1980; Farrar & Selwyn, 1967; Kane, Marcus, & 
McDonald, 1984; Miller, 1977) for examples. 
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following pecking order behavior2. This was because capital expenditure and operating cash 
flows display serial correlation, which can give the appearance of mean reversion.  
 
The capital structure research has focused on US data and there have been relatively few 
studies done on the Australian market. A key focus of the recent research into capital 
structure has been on understanding how dominant asymmetric information costs are for 
capital structure. If firms have a clear preference for external debt funding over external 
equity funding this would suggest that the optimal capital structure argument is relatively 
weak. Firms following this financing strategy will likely deviate for extended periods from 
their value maximising optimal capital structure. The catalyst for the renewed focus on 
pecking order theory came from (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) who tested for the 
preference of external debt over external equity by using a regression of a firm’s financing 
requirements (the financial deficit) against the change in long term debt. Their results were 
strongly supportive of the pecking order theory but later shown by (Frank & Goyal, 2003) to 
be a function of the sample and only applicable to large firms, with the results deteriorating 
with firm size. The latest papers have focused on why small firms appeared to favor external 
equity to external debt, the hypothesis being that small firms have more constraints in 
accessing debt so are forced to turn to equity financing sooner than large firms. This paper is 
an extension of this strand of research and focuses on the role of debt capacity, deficit size 
and firm size on a firm’s preference for external funding sources. 
3. Methodology 
We compare the financing behavior of Australian firms with other studies that have focused 
primarily on the US market. We have used a pecking order framework based on the model of 
(Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). The pecking order theory defines a clear hierarchy for 
financing preferences whereby when a firm requires external capital they will issue debt 
before equity. (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) tested this theory by comparing the amount of 
debt issued by firms relative to their capital requirements. The firm’s requirement for external 
                                            
2
 This was done by using simulations to generate datasets based on different financing behaviour which 
were then tested using both their pecking order model and a target adjustment static trade-off model. Their 
results showed that the target adjustment model had similar results even for firms following pecking order 
behaviour. The pecking order model on the other hand had very different results, with a coefficient of 0.02 and 
R2 of 0.02 for firms following static tradeoff behaviour. Their pecking order model has the power to 
differentiate between different types of financing behavior while the static trade-off model did not.   
6 
 
capital was termed the financial deficit, which is equal to capital expenditure plus investment 
in working capital plus cash dividend payments plus short term debt payable at the start of the 
period less operating cash flow3. A positive deficit implies that external capital is required 
while a negative deficit implies a surplus of internally generated cash flows.  
 
FDSSMt = It + DIVt + ∆Wt + SDt-1 - CFt        (1) 
 
FDSSMt = Financial Deficit ((Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) definition) 
It = Capital Expenditures  
DIVt = Cash Dividend Payments 
∆Wt = Change in Working Capital  
SDt-1 = Short Term Debt at the start of the period 
CFt = Cash Flow after Interest and Taxes 
 
To test the predictions of the pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) regressed 
the change in long term debt ∆Dt against the financial deficit (2).  This is the simplest form of 
testing the pecking order theory and has been used extensively in the literature. The general 
interpretation has been that the closer the value of β1 is to 1 the stronger the support for the 
pecking order theory. A β1 of 1 implies that all requirements for external capital will be met 
purely with debt.  
∆Dt = α + β1FDt + et         (2) 
 
The (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) specification was modified slightly in (Frank & Goyal, 
2003) who argued that short term debt should not be included on the right hand side of the 
equation because it is already included in the change in working capital.  
FDFGt = It + DIVt + ∆Wt - CFt         (3) 
 
FDFGt = Financial Deficit ((Frank & Goyal, 2003) definition) 
 
We have made the same modification for our model but also have made an additional 
modification to the definition of the financial deficit by removing changes in short term debt 
from the change in working capital. There are two reasons for this; firstly the pecking order 
                                            
3
 In this case the operating cash flow measure excludes changes in working capital so the change in working 
capital is not being counted twice. They use the indirect method of calculating operating cash flows by starting 
with net operating income and then adding back noncash items.  
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theory is not a theory on the term structure of debt that will be used to finance the financial 
deficit. It seems wrong to view only long term debt as a source of external debt financing. 
There are many firms that rely almost exclusively on short term debt which can be 
continuously refinanced. Firms may also use short term finance now to take advantage of 
favorable interest rates and then change the term structure later. Under the specification in (3) 
a financial deficit that is financed by short term debt causes no change in FDFGt, because the 
change in ∆Wt and It cancel each other out. The second problem with (3) is that the timing of 
debt refinancing can result in large swings in working capital. For example when long term 
debt has less than 12 months before expiry it has to be reclassified as short term debt on the 
balance sheet. In this situation when the debt is refinanced it would appear that there was a 
large financial deficit as working capital would increase by the reduction in short term debt. 
In our definition of the financial deficit we have separated working capital into operating 
working capital, short term debt and cash. This allows short term debt to be removed from the 
right hand side of the equation as in (5). We have also changed (2) to use changes in total 
debt rather than just changes in long term debt i.e. adding short term debt to the left hand side 
of the equation. 
 
Wt = OWt + SDt + Ct         (4) 
OWt = Operating Working Capital (essentially inventory + debtors – creditors) 
SDt = Short Term Debt 
Ct = Cash and Cash Equivalents 
 
FDt = It + DIVt + ∆OWt + ∆Ct - CFt        (5) 
The final important difference in the specification used in this paper is due to the differences 
in data sources and the definition of operating cash flows. Our sample is relatively recent 
which means that we have cash flow statement data whereas US studies using data prior to 
1988 had a variety of different cash flow reporting statements4. This means that we can use 
cash flow from operating activities directly from the cash flow statement which already 
includes changes in operating working capital. Our definition of the financial deficit is (6) 
and the financial deficit model specification is (7). Note that despite the definitional 
differences the only real difference between our specification and that of (Frank & Goyal, 
                                            
4
 For companies reporting under Compustat codes 1,2 & 3 these were; Working Capital Statement, Cash 
Statement by Source & Use of Funds and Cash Statement by Activity. While for Compustat code 7 (which was 
required post 1988) this was the Statement of Cash Flow. 
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2003) is that short term debt is removed from the right hand side of (6) and included in the 
left hand side  of (7).  
     
FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt        (6) 
∆TDt = α + β1FDt + et         (7) 
 
CFOt = Operating Cash Flow (direct from cash flow statement) 
∆TDt = Change in Long Term Debt + Change in Short Term Debt 
 
However there are still several problems with this specification that are common to the 
literature. The first is the issue of endogeneity of the financial deficit with regards to capital 
expenditure and dividend payments, obviously these variables can be used to adjust to 
expected shortfalls or surpluses in operating cash flows. In order to use the model developed 
here one has to assume that dividend policy and capital expenditure decisions are relatively 
sticky which means that surprises in operating cash flows are absorbed by changes in 
financing rather than changes in investment policy or dividend payments. 
 
The second flaw with this specification is the assumption of a linear relationship between 
debt issued and the financial deficit. This problem was identified by (Chirinko & Singha, 
2000) who argued that most firms have constraints on the amount of debt they can issue 
which implies that the size of the financial deficit does matter. In this case firms that are 
following the pecking order theory still have to issue external equity for sufficiently large 
financial deficits. A focus of recent research on capital structure has been to control for debt 
capacity in testing the pecking order theory. With debt capacity being modeled by a 
combination of the deficit size and firm specific characteristics5. We have used a quadratic 
model following (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) to capture the likely concave nature of debt 
issuance with financial deficit size. We scale the variables by total assets in order to obtain a 
meaningful coefficient for the quadratic term. This is done on the book value of total assets 
(TA) at the start of the period where FDAt = FDt/TAt-1 and TDAt as TDt/TAt-1. We use TAt-1 
because constraints on debt financing are more logically compared to the assets at the start of 
                                            
5(Agco & Mozumdar, 2007) use a piecewise linear specification, (De Jong, et al., 2009) use subsamples 
based on deficit size and firm characteristics while (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) use a quadratic model. 
9 
 
the period. Large investments can distort the actual relative size of new investment if 
compared with ending asset values.  
 
∆TDAt = α + β1FDAt + β2FDAt2 + et       (8) 
 
The problem with the specification above is that interpretation of the quadratic term is 
difficult as FDAt is both positive and negative. If the same relationship is expected for 
surplus and deficits (decreasing issuance (retirement) of debt with the absolute size of the size 
of the financial surplus (deficit)) then β2 will be meaningless because the sign will just 
depend on the relative proportion and absolute size of deficits to surpluses6. The solution is to 
use dummy variables to distinguish between surpluses and deficits. This also recognises that 
financing behavior may not be the same when firms are faced with a surplus versus a deficit. 
In (9) the dummy variable St takes a value of 1 when there is a financial surplus (negative 
FDAt) and a value of zero when there is a financial deficit (positive FDAt).  
 
∆TDAt = (α + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDAt + (β3 + β4St) FDAt2 + et    (9) 
 
Equation (9) is a test of the pecking order theory that allows a non-linear relationship 
between the financial deficit and the change in total debt. It also allows for differences in 
financing behavior between financial deficits and surpluses. The closer that β1 and (β1 + β2) 
are to the 1 the stronger the support for pecking order theory. The significance and size of β3 
and (β3 + β4) show the nature of constraints on financial deficits and financial surpluses 
respectively. The significance and size of β2 and β4 represent the differences in behavior 
between financial surpluses and deficits.  
 
In summary while the model developed here draws on previous work, it is new to the 
literature. The most significant change we have made is in the definition of the financial 
deficit by using total debt rather than long term debt. The use of dummy variables with the 
quadratic financial deficit is also new and should overcome some of the interpretation 
problems in (Lemmon & Zender, 2008). For ease of comparison we have also used the 
models of (Frank & Goyal, 2003) and that of (De Jong, et al., 2009) for our sample. 
                                            
6
 (De Jong, et al., 2009) point out the same problem stating that “a quadratic term of the financing deficit 
seems inappropriate as a negative deficit becomes positive when squared” 
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4. Data 
This section is a detailed analysis of the summary statistics of the sample, with particular 
reference to differences between financial deficits and surpluses and firm size. All data has 
been sourced from the Worldscope Database and includes all companies listed on the ASX 
over the time period 1995-20097. Consistent with previous studies, firms with an industry 
classification of Financials and Utilities have been excluded. We have also imposed a 
minimum asset size of $50m and excluded those firms whose primary listing is not in 
Australia. Firms are required to have values for each data item and we have excluded extreme 
values in top and bottom 1% of the distribution for certain variables8. The data is all sourced 
from fiscal year end accounts and consists of 3,852 firm year observations, including 702 
unique firms. A full list of data items and corresponding Worldscope codes is available in 
Appendix 1.  
 
A summary of the firm size data is shown in Table 1. As can be seen by comparing the means 
and medians the data heavily skewed towards smaller firms and that this trend has become 
more pronounced over time. This is not an unusual feature as the cost of equity listings has 
decreased over time which has allowed smaller firms to access public equity markets. The 
overall skew towards smaller companies is also not unusual but is important for 
interpretation. For example many researchers have shown that firm size is one of the most 
consistent variables to be correlated with leverage. The distribution of firm size is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7
 The original intention was to have data from the introduction of the dividend imputation scheme in 1987, 
however the data availability was not sufficient to have a diverse range of companies necessary for this analysis. 
1995 was chosen as the starting year as this was the first to have over 100 companies which we set as a 
minimum number of companies. 
8
 Specifically for FDAt and CDAt we removed the top 1% of the sample on both sides of the distribution. 
Other authors have taken a similar approach with (Frank & Goyal, 2003) using a 0.5% cut-off, (Agca & 
Mozumdar, 2007) imposing an absolute limit of 400% for all ratios divided by total assets and (Lemmon & 
Zender, 2008) use 200%.  
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Table 1. Firm Size Statistics 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed. Figures are in AUD $000’s.  
 
 
 
Table 2 shows the average gearing levels for the sample. There are a variety of different 
measures of leverage that have been used in the literature depending on the nature of the 
analysis. In this analysis we are not using the leverage ratio directly so this table is more for 
illustrative purposes. As expected the market leverage ratios are lower than book leverage 
ratios (which implies that market to book ratios are greater than 1). Long term debt makes up 
the majority of debt financing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Companies Total Assets (Average) Market Cap (Average) Total Assets (Median) Market Cap (Median)
1995 122 1,530,379 1,417,787 415,486 382,425
1996 145 1,426,420 1,390,318 380,640 385,320
1997 160 1,476,544 1,404,309 420,468 379,055
1998 160 1,562,788 1,199,751 449,543 295,295
1999 174 1,465,389 1,393,083 436,609 302,010
2000 199 1,380,900 1,284,939 331,755 263,098
2001 224 1,369,690 1,356,419 276,357 211,581
2002 283 1,180,448 1,206,368 208,367 171,375
2003 285 1,138,608 1,134,512 216,614 169,964
2004 289 1,254,147 1,468,677 239,816 240,325
2005 313 1,319,015 1,849,540 244,369 238,992
2006 344 1,403,173 2,094,162 242,997 261,168
2007 366 1,744,684 2,689,975 272,707 365,325
2008 388 1,805,072 2,000,709 242,445 205,226
2009 400 1,790,077 1,968,259 238,654 175,586
Total 3,852 1,476,618 1,695,157 273,541 248,859
Kurtosis 226.42 358.99
Skewness 12.85 17.18
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Table 2. Average Gearing Levels 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed. The market value of total assets is calculated by taking the book value of total assets, subtracting 
the book value of equity and adding the market capitalisation of the firm.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Gearing Levels over Time (Book vs. Market Value) 
 
Figure 2 shows average gearing levels over time which are actually relatively stable, although 
the market leverage ratio exhibits more volatility. This is not surprising but it is interesting to 
see the recent increase in market leverage ratios that can probably be attributed to the Global 
Financial Crisis 
Year Total Debt / Total Assets Long Term Debt / Total 
Assets
Total Debt / Total Assets 
(Market)
Long Term Debt / Total 
Assets (Market)
1995 20.80% 16.37% 16.42% 12.85%
1996 21.63% 16.67% 15.89% 12.30%
1997 23.31% 18.43% 16.66% 13.09%
1998 24.76% 20.03% 20.95% 16.89%
1999 24.77% 19.79% 20.76% 16.61%
2000 23.56% 18.58% 20.54% 15.98%
2001 25.57% 18.88% 21.66% 15.54%
2002 25.59% 17.36% 21.61% 14.50%
2003 24.78% 16.89% 20.82% 13.98%
2004 23.45% 16.51% 18.05% 12.34%
2005 23.42% 17.23% 17.19% 12.23%
2006 25.00% 17.95% 17.99% 12.43%
2007 24.68% 17.86% 16.33% 11.51%
2008 25.01% 18.50% 21.53% 15.38%
2009 24.56% 16.58% 23.92% 15.41%
Total 24.32% 17.74% 19.63% 13.97%
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As mentioned previously the sample is skewed towards smaller firms, which has an important 
impact on leverage ratios. Table 3 shows the differences in gearing levels for different firm 
sizes. We have split the sample based on intuitive firm size categories as follows; small firms 
(total assets < $500m), medium firms (total assets $500m - $2b) and large firms (total assets 
> $2b)9. The firm characteristics are considerably different across these chosen firm size 
categories. Large firms have considerably more debt (29% vs. 22%) and there are very few 
firms with no debt at all (<1%). By contrast a reasonable proportion (7%) of small companies 
have no debt and more than one quarter of the firms are net cash, which means that their cash 
balances exceed their total amount of debt. This is also quite important for interpretation as it 
implies that actual leverage ratios are less than the headline numbers would suggest, to the 
extent that firms are holding excess cash balances.  
 
Table 3. Firm Size and Leverage 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed. Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets $500m - $2b) 
and large (total assets > $2b). The No Debt column is the % of firms in that category that have no short or long 
term debt while the Net Cash column is the % of firms that have cash balances which exceed the value of total 
debt. 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the relative size of the financial deficit across the 
sample split into two groups, those that with financial deficits (Panel A) and those with 
financial surpluses (Panel B). Turning to financial deficits first the data shows that more 
firms have a financial deficit than a surplus, with 60% of firm years having a deficit. Also the 
average size of financial deficits is actually quite large, representing 20% of the preceding 
year’s total assets. There is considerable variation and cyclicality in the size of financial 
deficits over time which can be clearly seen in Figure 3, the peak in 2007 was 31% with the 
trough in 1999 of 13%. It is also apparent that the proportion of firms with a financial deficit 
follows a similar cyclical pattern, for example from 2006-08 the average proportion of firm 
                                            
9
 While this categorisation is ad-hoc we prefer this approach to an equal sized quintile method to get clear 
differentiation between the categories 
Size Firm Years Total Debt / Total Assets Total Debt / Total Assets 
(Market)
No Debt Net Cash
Small 2,429 22.42% 18.61% 7.16% 25.98%
Medium 835 26.39% 21.02% 2.40% 12.81%
Large 588 29.19% 21.85% 0.85% 5.61%
Total 3,852 24.32% 19.63% 5.17% 20.02%
14 
 
years having a deficit was 67% while in 1998-2000 the average proportion was 56%. The 
change in total debt appears to track the financial deficit reasonably closely and averages 
61% of the financial deficit. However the variation in the average change in total debt 
appears to be much less and spikes in the financial deficit are not matched by increasing use 
of debt. For example in 2007 the average change in debt was 16% compared to the average 
financial deficit of 31%, which implies that there was a considerable amount of equity 
financing used in this year. It is also interesting to note that firms with a financial deficit have 
more leverage compared to the average (26% vs. 24%) and are smaller with the average total 
asset size being $1.3b compared to the sample average of $1.5b. 
 
Table 4. The Financial Deficit and Change in Total Debt 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed. FDA is the financial deficit (which is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt) divided by the 
preceding years total assets. A positive FDA is a financial deficit while a negative FDA is a financial surplus. 
TDA is the change in total debt divided by the preceding year’s total assets. Total Assets are measured in AUD 
$000’s 
 
Panel A – Financial Deficits   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Firm Years FDA TDA Total Debt / Total Assets Total Assets
1995 59.84% 11.98% 7.52% 21.88% 1,897,691
1996 66.21% 12.24% 9.18% 24.57% 1,694,769
1997 61.25% 16.34% 12.08% 24.19% 1,350,824
1998 51.88% 18.24% 13.42% 27.33% 1,384,006
1999 56.32% 13.07% 6.94% 25.86% 1,154,528
2000 60.30% 18.01% 12.12% 25.05% 1,102,997
2001 58.48% 17.92% 15.10% 26.85% 1,252,755
2002 50.18% 16.99% 10.35% 26.15% 1,092,926
2003 50.18% 16.71% 12.58% 29.83% 1,057,637
2004 55.71% 19.20% 9.36% 25.29% 746,371
2005 65.18% 23.22% 15.05% 25.58% 1,293,188
2006 64.24% 22.69% 12.91% 25.46% 1,079,495
2007 68.58% 31.08% 16.33% 25.65% 1,512,831
2008 69.33% 23.97% 14.93% 27.93% 1,217,748
2009 54.00% 13.92% 6.46% 26.85% 1,884,550
Total 59.87% 19.88% 12.16% 26.15% 1,301,577
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Panel B – Financial Surpluses 
 
 
For financial surpluses (Panel B) the size of the surplus is smaller and variation seems to be 
less than for financial deficits. The average surplus size is 6% of the preceding year’s total 
assets. There does not appear to be a great deal of cyclicality in the average size of the 
financial surplus. The change in debt for firms with a financial surplus is considerably lower 
than those with a financial deficit, with the average reduction in debt being 3% of the 
preceding year’s total assets. The average change in debt also appears to track the financial 
surplus reasonably closely as can be seen in Figure 4, however there is a notable deviation in 
2006/07 where less of the surplus was used to repay debt (in 2006 the average change in debt 
was actually slightly positive). On average the amount of financial surplus used to repay debt 
is the same as for financial deficits at 61%. The average size of firms with a financial surplus 
is larger than the sample average ($1.7b vs. $1.5b) and they are less levered with the average 
leverage ratio being 22% compared to the sample average of 24%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year Firm Years FDA TDA Total Debt / Total Assets Total Assets
1995 40.16% -5.29% -3.11% 19.20% 983,158
1996 33.79% -4.63% -3.50% 15.86% 900,675
1997 38.75% -6.18% -3.89% 21.92% 1,675,263
1998 48.13% -5.31% -2.76% 21.99% 1,755,502
1999 43.68% -5.26% -4.03% 23.37% 1,866,236
2000 39.70% -5.94% -4.78% 21.29% 1,803,030
2001 41.52% -6.00% -3.93% 23.76% 1,534,404
2002 49.82% -6.90% -4.57% 25.02% 1,268,591
2003 49.82% -6.16% -3.93% 19.70% 1,220,149
2004 44.29% -4.84% -2.38% 21.13% 1,892,834
2005 34.82% -5.59% -3.14% 19.37% 1,367,352
2006 35.76% -4.84% 0.26% 24.18% 1,984,740
2007 31.42% -5.71% -1.12% 22.58% 2,250,729
2008 30.67% -5.56% -4.20% 18.39% 3,132,722
2009 46.00% -5.38% -5.33% 21.88% 1,679,174
Grand Total 40.13% -5.62% -3.40% 21.58% 1,737,708
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Figure 3. Average FDA vs. TDA for Firms With a Financial Deficit 
 
Figure 4. Average FDA vs. TDA for Firms With a Financial Surplus 
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To further decompose the differences between financial deficits and surpluses Table 5 shows 
the cash flows that make up the financial deficit and also how this varies across firm size. 
Firms with a financial deficit are shown in Panel A with the most important component of the 
financial deficit being capital expenditure, which averages 20% of the preceding year’s total 
assets. Operating cash flows on average are 11% while investment in working capital is 3%, 
investment in cash balances -4% (which represents an increase in cash balances) and 
dividend payments 4%. The average change in total debt of 12% is predominantly made up of 
long term debt at 8% with short term debt making up 4%. What is interesting from this table 
is that operating cash flows are relatively consistent across firm size at 11% but the size of 
the financial deficit varies considerably from 22% down to 14%. The ratio of the deficit that 
is financed by changes in debt also varies considerably across firm size. On average small 
firms’ finance 54% of the financial deficit with debt while large firm finance 83% of the 
financial deficit with debt. This trend is consistent with leverage ratios being lower for 
smaller firms. Also interesting is that the proportion of short term debt used for smaller firms 
is higher than for larger firms, small firms use 33% compared to large firm using 29%. In 
summary small firms that have a financial deficit appear to be investing relatively more than 
large firms and financing less of this investment with debt. 
  
Turning to financial surpluses in Panel B the obvious difference is the amount of capital 
expenditure, which is much lower at 3% of the preceding year’s total assets. However 
operating cash flows are reasonably similar at 12% as are dividend payments at 4%. 
Investment in cash balances and working capital are negative for surpluses at -1% & -2% 
respectively. The similarities in operating cash flow suggest that the main reason for firms 
facing financial surpluses is due to lower capital expenditure as opposed to variations in 
operating cash flow. The differences across firm size for firms with financial surpluses are 
not as dramatic as for those with financial deficits. Small firms with financial surpluses have 
higher capital expenditure but also higher profitability, the size of the financial surplus is not 
that different across firm size groups. Large firms on average will use more of the surplus to 
retire debt, with small firms only using 51% while large firms will use 69%. Leverage levels 
are lower for firms facing financial surpluses and the same pattern emerges with smaller 
firms having less debt than large firms. Consistent with the data from firms with financial 
deficits, small firms retire relatively more short term debt than long term debt than large firms 
(36% vs. 29%) when facing a financial surplus. 
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Table 5. Cash Flow Breakdown 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed. Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets between 
$500m and $2b) and large (total assets > $2b). All items are divided by total assets from the preceding year 
except for the leverage ratio which is total debt divided by the current year’s total assets. 
 
Panel A – Financial Deficits 
 
 
Panel B – Financial Surpluses 
 
 
Firm Size Total Small (<$500m) Medium ($500m - 2b) Large (>$2b)
CAPEX 20.04% 20.63% 20.33% 16.96%
Operating Workng Capital 2.56% 2.95% 2.37% 1.11%
Capital Requirements 22.60% 23.59% 22.69% 18.08%
Operating Cash Flows 11.09% 11.13% 11.05% 10.97%
Cash Dividends -4.07% -4.22% -3.93% -3.60%
Change in Cash -4.30% -4.91% -2.89% -3.70%
Internal Funding 2.72% 1.99% 4.23% 3.67%
Financial Deficit 19.88% 21.60% 18.46% 14.41%
Change in Short Term Debt 3.88% 3.87% 4.19% 3.41%
Change in Long Term Debt 8.29% 7.73% 9.75% 8.55%
Change in Total Debt 12.16% 11.60% 13.94% 11.96%
Firm Years 2,306 1,473 503 330
Firm Years / Total 63.88% 21.81% 14.31%
Total Debt / Total Assets 26.15% 24.06% 28.82% 31.40%
% Defict filled by Debt 61.17% 53.72% 75.51% 82.97%
Firm Size Total Small (<$500m) Medium ($500m - 2b) Large (>$2b)
CAPEX 3.22% 3.86% 2.56% 1.65%
Operating Workng Capital -1.84% -1.52% -1.33% -3.70%
Capital Requirements 1.37% 2.34% 1.23% -2.04%
Operating Cash Flows 11.95% 13.17% 10.15% 9.73%
Cash Dividends -3.83% -4.02% -3.47% -3.60%
Change in Cash -1.13% -0.86% -0.56% -2.85%
Internal Funding 6.99% 8.29% 6.13% 3.27%
Financial Deficit -5.62% -5.95% -4.90% -5.32%
Change in Short Term Debt -1.14% -1.09% -1.33% -1.06%
Change in Long Term Debt -2.26% -1.94% -2.90% -2.62%
Change in Total Debt -3.40% -3.04% -4.23% -3.68%
Firm Years 1,546 956 332 258
Firm Years / Total 61.84% 21.47% 16.69%
Total Debt / Total Assets 21.58% 19.90% 22.70% 26.38%
% Defict filled by Debt 60.51% 51.03% 86.30% 69.29%
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We have also grouped firms by the size of the financial deficit and examined the differences 
across firms with financial surpluses and deficits. To do this we take a similar approach to the 
firm size categories and group the data based on intuitive size limits rather than quintiles. 
This is because the distribution for financial deficits is skewed towards smaller observations 
and there is considerable asymmetry between financial deficits and surpluses. Figure 5 & 6 
depict the distribution for firms with financial surpluses and deficits respectively. The 
obvious feature of both charts is that most of the observations are close to zero. More than 
half of the entire sample has a financial deficit +/- 5% of the preceding year’s total assets. 
The asymmetry is strongly visible as well with the maximum financial surplus at 34% while 
the maximum deficit is 278%10. Bearing the shape of the distribution in mind we have chosen 
size categories as follows; small deficits (<5%), medium deficits (5-15%), large deficits (15-
50%) and very large deficits (>50%), these are all based on absolute values. We think it is 
important to realise that small deficits are probably not that relevant for capital structure 
decisions as no matter how they are financed it will not change gearing levels by that much. 
The fact that more than 50% of the data can be classified as either a small deficit or small 
surplus is probably indicative of capital expenditure planning by firms to match capital 
requirements with internal funding sources that are available.  
 
Table 6 shows the summary statistics based on these deficit size categories. What is 
interesting is that for the small and medium deficit size categories and for firms with a 
financial deficit the average financial deficit is very close to the average change in total debt. 
However as the size of the financial deficit increases the relationship appears to break down. 
For firms with a very large financial deficit the average deficit size is 96% compared to the 
average increase in total debt of 43%. It is also interesting that for firms with large and very 
large deficits the average firm size is considerably smaller than the sample average firm size 
($1.5b) and also the average firm size for firms with a financial deficit ($1.3b (from Table 
4)). For firms with a financial surplus there does not seem to be a relationship with the deficit 
size and the ratio of the average financial surplus and change in total debt, which is consistent 
across the categories. What is interesting is that the average firm size for those firms with a 
small financial surplus is almost identical to those firms with a small financial deficit. 
                                            
10
 As mentioned previously the FDA series has had the top/bottom 1% of the distribution excluded, the 
truncation point of 34% is clearly visible in Figure 5. The scale for both Figure 5 & 6 has been set identical for 
ease of comparison although there are observations outside the maximum 200% for Figure 5. 
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However for firms with a medium size surplus the average firm size is considerably higher at 
$2.4b. 
 
Table 6. Financial Deficit Size 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed. The deficit size is categorised as being small (FDA < 5%), medium (FDA 5-15%), large (FDA 
15-50%) and very large (FDA >50%). The categories are based on the absolute value (abs) of FDA. FDA is the 
financial deficit (which is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt) divided by the preceding years total assets. A 
positive FDA is a financial deficit while a negative FDA is a financial surplus. TDA is the change in total debt 
divided by the preceding year’s total assets. Total Assets are measured in AUD $000’s 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Financial Surpluses 
 
Figure 6. Financial Deficits 
 
In summary the analysis of this sample shows clear differences between firms with financial 
surpluses and those with financial deficits, the distribution for both is skewed with most 
observations relatively close to zero. Average gearing levels are reasonably stable over time 
(when using book value of total assets) and a considerable proportion (approximately 1/5) of 
the sample are in a net cash position. Smaller firms have higher financial deficits which are 
mainly driven by higher capital expenditure requirements, however they use relatively less 
debt to finance this expenditure and some use no debt at all, leverage ratios are lower. 
Deficit Size Small (<5% abs) Medium (5-15% abs) Large (15-50% abs) Very Large (>50% abs)
Deficits
Firm Years 828 664 591 223
Total Assets 1,550,415 1,287,103 1,044,102 1,103,104
FDA 2.10% 9.36% 27.86% 96.13%
TDA 2.28% 7.71% 19.38% 43.00%
Surpluses
Firm Years 921 497 128
Total Assets 1,547,430 2,351,252 724,536
FDA -2.01% -8.48% -20.46%
TDA -1.21% -5.04% -12.76%
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Profitability is reasonably consistent across the firm size categories as are dividend payments. 
There are clear differences in financing behavior based on the size of the financial deficit and 
it appears that large deficits are funded less by debt than small and medium sized deficits. 
Overall this analysis appears to be supportive of pecking order behavior with constraints as 
evidenced by lower use of debt by small firms (most likely to face financial constraints) and 
less use of debt with increasing size of financial deficits. The next section investigates these 
relationships empirically. 
5. Results 
This first part of this section is an application of the models developed by (Frank & Goyal, 
2003), (De Jong, et al., 2009) and (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) to our sample. We will refer to 
these models as FG, DVV and LZ respectively. As outlined in the literature review there has 
been relatively little research into capital structure in Australia and to our knowledge these 
models have not been tested with Australian data. One of the main goals of this paper was to 
allow a meaningful comparison to be made with these studies, so we have replicated their 
work as closely as possible with our sample.  
 
The work of (Frank & Goyal, 2003) was an extension of the seminal paper by (Shyam-
Sunder & Myers, 1999) who first introduced the financial deficit model as a method for 
testing the pecking order theory. As discussed in the literature review they found strong 
support for the pecking order theory but their results were later shown to be specific to the 
sample they used, which required continuous data for the entire sample period. (Frank & 
Goyal, 2003) was the first major study to extend the financial deficit model to a larger 
unrestricted sample and they found that the explanatory power of the model reduced 
substantially. For the period 1971-1989 the financial deficit coefficient for the restricted 
sample (requiring continuous data) was 0.75, while for the unrestricted sample this was only 
0.28. Or put another way for the unrestricted sample firms on average used more equity than 
debt to fund their financial deficit, which was entirely the opposite prediction of the pecking 
order theory. The explanatory power of the model reduced from having an adjusted R2 of 
0.70 to just 0.27 for the unrestricted sample. (Frank & Goyal, 2003) also found that the 
pecking order model performed worse over a more recent time period. For the period 1990-
1998 the financial deficit coefficients were much lower and the explanatory power greatly 
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reduced. These results were interpreted as being strong evidence against the pecking order 
theory.  
 
Table 7. FG Model (Results Reproduced from (Frank & Goyal, 2003)) 
 
Their sample was US firms from the time period 1971-1998 and has been broken into two subsamples. Financial 
and utility firms were removed as were firms with missing data values. The restricted sample required each firm 
to have complete data for each year of the sample period. All variables were scaled by total assets. The model 
estimated was ∆Dt = α + β1 FDFGt + et where FDFGt is the FG definition of the financial deficit; FDFGt = It + DIVt 
+ ∆Wt - CFt. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors 
  
 Period 1971-1989 Period 1990-1998 
 Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample 
α0 -0.005*** 0.001* -0.007*** -0.004*** 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
    
β1 0.283*** 0.748*** 0.148*** 0.325*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.708 0.120 0.283 
N 89,883 14,952 57.687 18,225 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
 
Table 8. FG Model (Our Sample) 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and bottom 1% of observations. 
The restricted sample requires each firm to have complete data for each year of the sample period. All variables 
are scaled by total assets. The model estimated was ∆Dt = α + β1 FDFGt + et where FDFGt is the FG definition of 
the financial deficit; FDFGt = It + DIVt + ∆Wt - CFt. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors 
 
  Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample 
α0 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
 
  
β1 0.450*** 0.553*** 
 
(0.010) (0.024) 
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.402 
N 3,852 773 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Table 8 shows the results of the FG model for our sample .These results show more support 
for the pecking order model for the unrestricted sample with a coefficient of 0.45 and R2 of 
0.36. There is also less divergence between the restricted and unrestricted samples but the 
same pattern is observed with a higher coefficient and explanatory power for the restricted 
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sample. However the results for the restricted sample are well below the (Frank & Goyal, 
2003) results for 1971-1989, where they estimated a coefficient of 0.75 and R2 value of 0.70. 
So while the results for our sample would not necessarily be considered strong support for the 
pecking order theory they are certainly stronger than what was reported by (Frank & Goyal, 
2003) for the unrestricted sample, particularly in comparison to the period 1990-1998 which 
has the most overlap with our sample.     
 
However as pointed out by (Frank & Goyal, 2003) the key difference in firm characteristics 
between the restricted and unrestricted samples is that of firm size. They showed that firm 
size was critical to the performance of the pecking order model with smaller firms less likely 
to follow the pecking order theory relative to larger firms. Their interpretation was that this 
finding was even stronger evidence against the pecking order theory as small firms would be 
expected to face higher asymmetric information costs and exhibit a greater reluctance to issue 
equity. Therefore they should have a higher preference for debt financing. Table 9 shows the 
results for the FG model with the sample grouped by the firm size categories from the 
previous section 
 
Table 9. FG Model and Firm Size 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and bottom 1% of observations. 
The model estimated was ∆Dt = α + β1 FDFGt + et where FDFGt is the FG definition of the financial deficit; FDFGt 
= It + DIVt + ∆Wt - CFt. Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets 
$500m - $2b) and large (total assets > $2b), total assets are measured in $AUD. Numbers in parentheses are the 
standard errors 
 
 
Unrestricted 
Sample 
Small Firm Size 
(<$500m) 
Medium Firm Size 
($500m - $2b) 
Large Firm Size 
(>$2b) 
α0 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.005 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
    
β1 0.450*** 0.413*** 0.560*** 0.510*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.029) 
Adjusted R2 0.364 0.348 0.455 0.342 
N 3,852 2,431 832 589 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Like (Frank & Goyal, 2003) we also have found differences in the explanatory power of the 
model across firm size, but to a much smaller and less consistent degree. Small firms show 
less support with a lower estimated coefficient of 0.41 compared to 0.56 and 0.51 for medium 
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and large firms respectively. (Frank & Goyal, 2003) split their sample into quartiles based on 
firm size and estimate coefficients of 0.16, 0.43, 0.62 and 0.75 from the smallest to largest 
firm size quartile. So while the criteria we use for firm size is different, it does not appear that 
the estimated coefficient increases with firm size to the same extent as for the FG sample. 
This could be related to our earlier finding of less divergence between the unrestricted and 
restricted sample in Table 8.  
 
The second model we have applied to our sample is the DVV model, which is an extension of 
the FG model in that it allows differences in financing behavior between financial deficits 
and surpluses. We have already shown the differences in the distribution characteristics for 
financial deficits and surpluses in the previous section which would support the idea that they 
need to be analysed differently. The DVV model uses a dummy variable to allow different 
intercepts and slope coefficients for deficits and surpluses. Table 10 shows the results of 
DVV model applied to our sample in comparison with their reported results. 
 
Table 10. DVV Model 
 
Our sample was Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values were removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets. The DVV sample was US companies over 
the time period 1971-2005 which excludes financial and utility firms and those with missing data values. The 
model estimated is ∆Dt = (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDFGt + et where FDFGt is the FG definition of the financial 
deficit; FDFGt = It + DIVt + ∆Wt - CFt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. 
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
  Our Sample DVV Sample 
α0 0.020*** 0.029*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
  
α1 -0.020*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
 
  
β1 0.332*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.014) (0.005) 
 
  
β
 2 0.255*** 0.746*** 
 
(0.029) (0.013) 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.390 
N 3,852 233,909 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Our results have very different coefficients but like (De Jong, et al., 2009) show differences 
between financial deficits and surpluses with both the intercept and coefficient on the dummy 
variable being statistically significant. We find a coefficient of 0.33 (β1) for financial deficits 
and 0.59 for financial surpluses (β1 + β2) while they found a coefficient of 0.15 for financial 
deficits and 0.90 for financial surpluses. The explanatory power of the model is similar with 
an R2 value of 0.39 for both studies. However the improvement in explanatory power for our 
sample is negligible between the DVV and FG model as it increases from 0.36 to 0.39, in 
contrast the explanatory power for (De Jong, et al., 2009) increased from 0.23 (not shown in 
the table) to 0.39. Therefore the difference in coefficients between financial deficits and 
surpluses did not have much of an impact on the explanatory power of the FG model in our 
sample but did for the sample used by (De Jong, et al., 2009).  
 
Another important feature of the (De Jong, et al., 2009) results was the high and significant 
intercept term for financial deficits. This is economically significant as it implies that a firm 
with a zero financial deficit will be increasing debt by 2.9% of the preceding year’s total 
assets. In the previous section we showed that the distribution of financial deficits is strongly 
skewed towards zero (more than 50% of the observations are +/- 5%). To illustrate the 
importance of the intercept term let’s take an example of a firm with a 5% financial deficit. 
Using the estimated coefficients from the DVV model for the (De Jong, et al., 2009) sample 
this firm would fund the financial deficit by increasing debt by 3.7% (2.9% + 0.155 x 5%) of 
the preceding years total assets, or put another way, the firm would cover 74% of the deficit 
with debt. Using the estimated DVV model from our sample yields an identical result with 
total debt increasing by 3.7% (2.0% + 0.332 x 5%). Therefore despite the very different 
estimated coefficients for the two samples using the DVV model the differences in the 
intercept actually result in a similar magnitude of debt financing for a large part of the sample 
distribution. This highlights the danger of making an incorrect interpretation that the low 
financial deficit coefficient of 0.155 implies weak support for the pecking order theory. 
However for financial surpluses the negative intercept on the dummy variable almost cancels 
out the positive intercept term for deficits so the estimated increase in total debt for firms 
with a surplus close to zero is also close to zero. The (De Jong, et al., 2009) results therefore 
show stronger support for the pecking order theory as it applies to surpluses (due to the 
higher coefficient on both dummy variable) than in our sample but not necessarily weaker 
support for financial deficits due to the magnitude of the intercept term.  
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Table 11 shows the results from the DVV model applied to different firm size groups in our 
sample, which shows the same pattern as the results from the FG model. Smaller firms have a 
lower coefficient for financial deficits than medium and large firms. However for financial 
surpluses small firms have a higher coefficient than medium and large firms. This could 
indicate that small firms are more constrained so they will use more of their financial 
surpluses to reduce debt or alternatively that they expect to have higher capital expenditure 
requirements in the future so want to preserve more future debt capacity. In summary the 
direct comparisons of our sample with the (Frank & Goyal, 2003) and (De Jong, et al., 2009) 
studies show that the data in our sample is different to these two studies. There seems to be 
more support for the pecking order theory in our sample using the FG model and there does 
not seem to be the same degree of divergence between the restricted and unrestricted samples 
or across different firm sizes. Using the DVV model we find asymmetry between financial 
surpluses and deficits but this does not help to explain much more of the variation in changes 
in long term debt as it does for the results from (De Jong, et al., 2009). 
 
Table  11. DVV Model and Firm Size 
 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. The model estimated is ∆Dt = (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDFGt + et where FDFGt is the 
FG definition of the financial deficit; FDFGt = It + DIVt + ∆Wt - CFt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets 
$500m - $2b) and large (total assets > $2b), total assets are measured in $AUD. Numbers in parentheses are the 
standard errors. 
 
 
Unrestricted 
Sample 
Small Firm Size 
(<$500m) 
Medium Firm Size 
($500m - $2b) 
Large Firm Size 
(>$2b) 
α0 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
    
α1 -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
 
    
β1 0.332*** 0.302*** 0.456*** 0.359*** 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.030) (0.049) 
 
    
Β2 0.255*** 0.276*** 0.206*** 0.198** 
 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.067) (0.081) 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.372 0.468 0.355 
N 3,852 2,431 832 589 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
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We now turn to the results from our alternative definition of the financial deficit which 
removes short term debt from the right hand side of the financial deficit equation and 
includes short term debt on the left hand side of the financial deficit models. The results are 
shown in Table 12 for both the FG and DVV model. The results are very similar under our 
definition with only marginal changes in the explanatory power of the two models and 
marginal changes in the magnitude of the coefficients. Therefore while our definition does 
not appear to add anything in terms of explanatory power, it does not appear to detract 
anything either. We find this definition more intuitively and theoretically appealing and have 
used it for the rest of the paper.  
 
Table 12. Alternative Financial Deficit Definition 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period  1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start of the period. Our amendment to 
the FG model is  ∆TDt = α + β1FDt + et and to the DDV model is  ∆TDt = (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDt + et where 
∆TDt is change in total debt (as opposed to long term debt) and the financial deficit is defined as FDt = It + DIVt 
+ ∆Ct - CFOt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. Numbers in parentheses 
are the standard errors. 
 
  
Unrestricted Sample (FG 
Model) 
Restricted Sample (FG 
Model) 
Unrestricted Sample 
(DVV Model) 
α0 0.018*** 0.007 0.047*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
   
α1   -0.048*** 
 
  (0.007) 
 
   
β1 0.423*** 0.566*** 0.370*** 
 
(0.009) (0.024) (0.010) 
 
   
β
 2   0.222*** 
 
  (0.070) 
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.418 0.368 
N 3,852 775 3,852 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Following the (Frank & Goyal, 2003) finding that the work of (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999) did not generalize across a continuous sample and that their results were highly 
sensitive to firm size the focus of the literature has been on understanding why smaller firms 
use less debt. The obvious answer is that it is more difficult and expensive for these firms to 
access debt markets. If this is the case then the (Frank & Goyal, 2003) findings would not 
28 
 
necessarily contradict the pecking order theory, so long as firms were unable to follow the 
pecking order financing hierarchy due to constraints on debt capacity. There have been 
several approaches taken to empirically examine the pecking order model with debt capacity 
constraints. As a first step we chose to follow (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) who added a 
quadratic term to the FG model, however we extend their model by including dummy 
variables to differentiate between financial deficits and surpluses which is equation (9) in the 
methodology section. We will term our model the RC model for the remainder of the paper. 
Table 13 shows a comparison of the results of the RC model against the LZ model for our 
sample 
  
Table 13. RC Model 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start of the period. The RC model is  
∆TDt = (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDt +(β3 + β4St) FD2t + et  where ∆TDt is change in total debt and the financial 
deficit is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if FDt<0 or 0 
if FDt>=0. The LZ model is ∆TDt = α0 + β1 FDt +β3 FD2t + et. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.  
 
 Our Model  LZ Model 
α0 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
 
  
α1 -0.005  
 
(0.008)  
 
  
β1 0.698*** 0.698*** 
 
(0.022) (0.016) 
 
  
β
 2 0.183  
 
(0.177)  
 
  
β
 3 -0.210*** -0.209*** 
 
(0.013) (0.011) 
 
  
β
 4 1.545**  
 
(0.750)  
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.409 
N 3,852 3.852 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
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The first point to note is that explanatory power is marginally improved over the DVV model 
with an R2 of 0.41 versus 0.37. What is interesting is the much higher magnitude of the 
financial deficit coefficient of 0.70; also the coefficient on the quadratic term for the financial 
deficit is negative and significant. This implies that the use of debt decreases with the size of 
the financial deficit, which is the expected result. The dummy variable for the quadratic term 
is positive and significant, which implies that the amount of the financial surplus applied to 
reduce total debt decreases with the size of the surplus. However the coefficients for the 
dummy variables for the intercept and slope are not significant. Both models estimate a very 
similar coefficient for β1 and β 3 and have almost identical explanatory power. This suggests 
that after allowing for a non-linear relationship between the deficit and change in debt that 
there is no difference in the relationship between financial deficits and surpluses, which is the 
opposite interpretation that we made using the DVV model. This highlights the advantages of 
the RC model as it allows more precise interpretations to be made by allowing for a non-
linear relationship between the financial deficit and change in debt as well as allowing for 
differences between financial deficits and surpluses. The LZ or DVV models by themselves 
would not be able to make this distinction.    
 
Table 14 shows the differences across the firm size groupings using the RC model. There are 
strong differences across firm size, which are more noticeable than for the DVV model. The 
results at first glance seem quite counterintuitive as the significance of the quadratic term for 
the financial deficit increases with firm size. This is the opposite of what would be expected 
as large firms should theoretically vary their financing behavior less over the size the 
financial deficit. They should have fewer constraints on issuing debt, lower transaction costs 
for issuing equity and lower asymmetric information costs. All of these factors suggest that 
while large firms should exhibit different financing behavior to small firms, this should not 
be based on the deficit size, or at least not to the same degree as for small firms. However if 
we return to the statistics on deficit size in the previous section there was a notable difference 
in average firm size for large and very large sized deficits in comparison to small and 
medium sized deficits. The average firm size for small and medium sized deficits was larger 
and the average deficit size for large firms was lower. Therefore the quadratic term may not 
be so relevant for the bulk of the observations for the large firm category. As an illustration 
we have plotted the estimated equations from the RC model in Figures 7 and 8. For Figure 7 
we have deliberately chosen the depicted range to exclude very large financial deficit size 
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category, with the range for the financial deficit going from -50% to +50% which 
corresponds to the small, medium and large deficit size categories (and which contains 94% 
of the sample). As can be seen from the chart the estimated equation is pretty close to linear 
over this range with only slight curvature being observable. 
 
Table 14. RC Model and Firm Size 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start of the period. The model is  ∆TDt 
= (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDt +(β3 + β4St) FD2t + et  where ∆TDt is change in total debt and the financial deficit is 
defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. 
Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets $500m - $2b) and large (total 
assets > $2b), total assets are measured in $AUD. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.  
 
 
Entire Sample Small Firm Size 
(<$500m) 
Medium Firm Size 
($500m - $2b) 
Large Firm Size 
(>$2b) 
α0 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.006 -0.013 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
 
    
α1 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 0.017 
 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) 
 
    
β1 0.698*** 0.609*** 0.885*** 1.180*** 
 
(0.022) (0.026) (0.046) (0.073) 
 
    
β
 2 0.183 0.284 0.053 -0.215 
 
(0.177) (0.228) (0.347) (0.429) 
 
    
β
 3 -0.210*** -0.197*** -0.217*** -0.460*** 
 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.025) (0.045) 
 
    
β
 4 1.545** 1.596 1.478 2.238 
 
(0.750) (0.989) (1.417) (1.701) 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.363 0.589 0.467 
N 3,852 2,429 835 588 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 7. RC Model for Small, Medium and Large Deficits 
 
This is a graph showing the estimated equation from the RC model across different financial deficit sizes for the 
different firm size categories. However we have only used the coefficients that are significantly different from 
zero (we used a 0.1 significance level as a cutoff), for those that were insignificant we used a zero value i.e. α1, β 
2 and β 4 were all set to zero. The range has been set to only plot financial deficits between  -50% and 50% 
(which corresponds to the small, medium and large deficit size categories). Figure 8 is the same graph over a 
wider financial deficit range of -250% to 250%. 
 
 
Figure 8. RC Model Including Very Large Deficits  
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Figure 8 shows the same equations plotted over a larger financial deficit range of -250% to 
250% which includes the very large deficit size category. It is easy to see from these two 
charts that the curvature in the quadratic model only starts to have a large impact for very 
large financial deficits. These charts highlight that while the quadratic model has improved 
explanatory power for the entire sample, for the vast majority of the observations the 
relationship is reasonably close to linear and not vastly different between financial surpluses 
and deficits. This is apparent by the insignificance of the dummy variables for the intercept 
(α1) and slope (β 2) across all firm size categories. 
 
The RC model highlights the weaknesses in interpretation when using the FG and DVV 
models, which are heavily influenced by the deficit size. For the majority of our sample 
which lies in the small, medium and large size financial deficit categories (94% of the 
sample) there is relatively strong support for pecking order behavior, particularly for larger 
firms. However as shown in Figure 8 this relationship falls away sharply for very large 
deficits. By allowing for a non-linear relationship between the financial deficit and change in 
total debt we no longer find differences between financial deficits and surpluses as the 
dummy variable are no longer significant. However the explanatory power of the RC model 
is still relatively low with an R2 of 0.41 for the entire sample (although it is higher for 
medium and large firms). 
 
The next step in our analysis is to examine the impact of debt capacity on our results. Debt 
capacity constraints have been a key focus of the recent literature on the pecking order theory 
of capital structure following the findings of (Frank & Goyal, 2003) who showed that firm 
size is critical to the performance of the theory. Debt capacity (or lack of debt capacity) could 
be a reason why small firms issue more equity than large firms, it could be that firms have a 
clear order of preference for debt financing over equity but have a higher risk profile that 
prevents them from accessing debt funding beyond a certain level.  
 
The (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) approach to control for debt capacity was based on access to 
public debt markets. They used a logit model with firm specific characteristics as explanatory 
variables for the probability whether a firm had a credit rating, which controls for the 
problem of excluding credit worthy companies that had chosen not to access public debt 
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markets. This approach is relatively simple but does suffer from the drawback that it heavily 
favors large firms (who are more likely to have a credit rating) over small firms. There is also 
the problem of differences across different credit ratings; for example there is a big difference 
in the debt capacity of firms that issue A graded debt versus firms that issue C graded debt. It 
is very simplistic to assume homogeneity across credit rating grades. This approach is also 
difficult to apply to the Australian market where there is a greater use of bank debt than in the 
US Market. (Agca & Mozumdar, 2007) use a piecewise linear model whereby they estimate a 
firms debt capacity from factors that have been shown to be important in cross sections 
regressions from the static trade-off theory literature11. A more simplistic approach is taken 
by (De Jong, et al., 2009) who use the same factors but split the sample into two groups based 
on whether they are above or below the median for each of the factors. For example they 
classify constrained firms as having below median sales, below median asset tangibility, 
below median profitability and above median market-to-book ratios. This suffers from the 
problem that each factor is assumed to be equally important and mutually exclusive. It is also 
immediately biases the results by using sales (which is good proxy for firm size) as a sorting 
factor i.e. it is not possible for a firm with above median sales to fall into the constrained 
category.  
 
we have taken a different approach by controlling for debt capacity by using Altman’s Z-
Score as a measure of financial distress. This measure has been used for a long time to predict 
bankruptcy and despite being developed in 1968 has still shown to be remarkably accurate12, 
and is also very easy to calculate. The score is based on 5 common accounting ratios that 
contain information about a firm’s liquidity, leverage, profitability and productivity. The 
weighting of each ratio was determined using discriminant analysis based on a paired sample 
of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. We have decided to use the original coefficients in 
(Altman, 1968) which have become industry practice13. More importantly the original Z-
score coefficients have also been shown to be effective at predicting bankruptcy in 
Australia14.   
                                            
11
 The factors used are profitability, market-to-book ratio, tangibility and sales. 
12
 For example a recent study by (Russ, Achilles, & Greenfield Jr, 2009) found that the original Z-score 
model and coefficients still has a 72% accuracy rate in predicting bankruptcy. 
13
 Compustat provides users with Z-score using the original coefficients without the user having to perform 
any calculations.  
14
 See (Bishop, Crapp, Faff, & Twite, 1994) 
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The original coefficients and ratios are shown in (10). 
 
Z-Score = 1.2 WCTA + 1.4 RETA + 3.3 EBITTA + 0.6 MVEBL + STA  (10) 
 
WCTA – Working Capital / Total Assets 
RETA – Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
EBITTA – EBIT / Total Assets 
MVEBL – Market Value of Equity / Book Value of Liabilities 
STA – Sales / Total Assets 
 
The WCTA ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to total assets and is 
defined as the difference between current assets and liabilities. Ordinarily a firm experiencing 
consistent operating losses will have shrinking current assets in relation to total assets. RETA 
is a representation of the total amount of reinvested earnings and losses over the firm’s 
lifetime and as such is a measure of cumulative profitability over time. It is also an indirect 
measure of leverage and past financing decisions as firms with high retained earnings have 
financed their assets through the reinvestment of profits. The EBITTA ratio is a measure of 
current profitability and is independent of leverage so is the best measure of the earning 
power of the firm’s assets. MVEBL is the inverse of the debt/equity ratio and simply a 
current leverage measure, in other versions of the Z-score (such as for unlisted companies) 
the book value of equity is substituted for the market value of equity. Finally STA is a 
reflection of the sales generating ability of the firm’s assets.  
 
The Z-Score was intended as a measure of bankruptcy probability with the lower the score 
the more likely the firm would be in financial distress. The cutoff score traditionally used is 
1.81 which meant that firms with a Z-score of below 1.81 are predicted to file for bankruptcy. 
A softer cutoff score of 2.67 is used a second measure of financial distress with these firms 
being likely to file for bankruptcy. We use the same cutoff scores in this analysis, so firms 
with a Z-score of under 1.81 we have classified as being in financial distress, firms with a Z-
score between 1.81 and 2.67 are classified as being capacity constrained while firms with a 
Z-score above 2.67 are viewed as being unconstrained with respect to further debt issuance. 
Table 15 shows the proportion of firms in each category over time, which is also plotted in 
Figure 9 for distressed and unconstrained firms.  
35 
 
Table 15. Proportion of Firms in Z-Score Categories by Year 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed. The data shown is the proportion of firms in each 
year for each Z-Score category. The categories are based on the preceding year’s Z-score and are categorised as 
follows; distressed (Z-Score less than 1.81), constrained (Z-Score 1.81-2.67) and unconstrained (Z-Score over 
2.67). The Z-scores are generated from Altman’s original coefficients, with each ratio being winsorised at the 
1% and 99% level. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Proportion of Firms classified as Distressed and Unconstrained 
 
Year Distressed              
(<1.81)
Constrained                  
(1.81-2.67)
Unconstrained            
(>2.67)
1995 8.20% 24.59% 67.21%
1996 8.97% 20.69% 70.34%
1997 7.50% 18.13% 74.38%
1998 11.88% 21.25% 66.88%
1999 21.84% 20.11% 58.05%
2000 24.62% 20.10% 55.28%
2001 26.34% 20.09% 53.57%
2002 29.68% 25.80% 44.52%
2003 27.02% 22.46% 50.53%
2004 25.26% 23.53% 51.21%
2005 16.61% 20.77% 62.62%
2006 18.90% 20.06% 61.05%
2007 22.40% 16.94% 60.66%
2008 18.04% 18.30% 63.66%
2009 29.75% 20.25% 50.00%
Total 21.34% 20.66% 58.00%
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As can be seen (and as expected) the scores are cyclical with firms in distressed category 
peaking in 2009 and also reaching elevated levels from 2001-03. The average proportion of 
firms in the distressed category is 21% while the proportion of firms in the unconstrained 
category is 58%. 
 
One of the key advantages of using the Z-score to measure debt capacity is that the score is 
not unduly influenced by firm size. This is apparent in Table 16 which shows the proportion 
of firms in each firm size category in each Z-score category. The proportion of small, 
medium and large firms that are classified as being distressed is very consistent at 21% while 
the proportion of firms that are classified as being unconstrained is actually skewed towards 
smaller firms, with 62% of small firms being classified as unconstrained compared to 45% of 
large firms. The proportion of firms in the unconstrained category with a financial deficit is 
relatively high at 64%, which suggests that capacity impacts whether a firm has a deficit or 
surplus regardless of how it is financed. A similar trend emerges when looking at the number 
of firms with a financial deficit relative to Z-Score categories, 62% of these firms are in the 
unconstrained category while only 53% of the firms with a financial surplus are in the 
unconstrained category.  
 
Table 16. Proportions of Firms in Z-Score Categories by Firm Size 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed. The data shown is the proportion of firms in each 
year for each Z-Score category. The categories are based on the preceding year’s Z-score and are categorised as 
follows; distressed (Z-Score less than 1.81), constrained (Z-Score 1.81-2.67) and unconstrained (Z-Score over 
2.67). The Z-Scores are generated from Altman’s original coefficients, with each ratio being winsorised at the 
1% and 99% level. Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets $500m - 
$2b) and large (total assets > $2b), total assets are measured in $AUD. The financial deficit is defined as FDt = It 
+ DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt with a positive FD representing a deficit while a negative FD represents a surplus. 
 
 
 
Table 17 shows a breakdown of the characteristics of firms in each of the Z-Score categories 
and also split by whether they have a financial deficit or surplus. The purpose of this table is 
Firm Size Distressed                  
(<1.81)
Constrained                  
(1.81-2.67)
Unconstrained            
(>2.67)
Small (<$500m) 21.37% 16.47% 62.17%
Medium ($500m - $2b) 21.20% 23.47% 55.33%
Large (>$2b) 21.43% 34.01% 44.56%
Total 21.34% 20.66% 58.00%
Financial Deficits 19.38% 19.04% 61.58%
Financial Surplus 24.26% 23.09% 52.65%
Financial Deficits (of Category) 54.38% 55.15% 63.56%
Financial Surplus (of Category) 45.62% 44.85% 36.44%
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to examine how well the categories appear to differentiate firms in relation to capacity 
constraints.  
 
Table 17. Z-Score Category Characteristics 
 
The sample period is 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a minimum total asset size of 
$50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed. The categories are based on the preceding year’s Z-
score and are categorised as follows; distressed (Z-Score less than 1.81), constrained (Z-Score 1.81-2.67) and 
unconstrained (Z-Score over 2.67). The Z-scores are generated from Altman’s original coefficients, with each 
ratio being winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. Panel A shows statistics for firms with a financial deficit 
(FDA>0) while Panel B show is for firms with a financial surplus (FDA<0). FDA is the financial deficit (which 
is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt) divided by the preceding years total assets. Total Assets are 
measured in AUD $000’s 
 
Panel A – Financial Deficits 
 
 
Panel B – Financial Surpluses 
 
 
Starting with Panel A which shows financial deficits, the characteristics of firms that are 
unconstrained is clearly different from those that are constrained or distressed. The size of the 
financial deficit is increasing over the constraint categories from 16% for distressed firms to 
22% for unconstrained firms, which is being driven by CAPEX showing the same trend over 
Z-Scores Distressed                      
(<1.81)
Constrained                  
(1.81-2.67)
Unconstrained            
(>2.67)
CAPEX 14.08% 17.73% 22.64%
Operating Cash Flow 5.76% 8.05% 13.71%
Dividend Payments 1.34% 2.77% 5.33%
Financial Deficit 15.58% 18.17% 21.77%
Change in Total Debt 9.41% 11.04% 13.38%
Total Debt / Total Assets 39.10% 31.15% 20.52%
EBIT / Interest Expense (median) 2.54 3.95 8.00
Total Debt / EBIT (median) 5.72 3.73 2.04
Total Assets 1,249,762 1,880,477 1,138,918
Firm Years 447 439 1,420
Firms Net Cash 38 25 333
Z-Scores Distressed                    
(<1.81)
Constrained                  
(1.81-2.67)
Unconstrained            
(>2.67)
CAPEX 1.01% 2.00% 4.77%
Operating Cash Flow 8.41% 8.74% 14.98%
Dividend Payments 1.15% 2.42% 5.69%
Financial Deficit -6.74% -5.99% -4.94%
Change in Total Debt -4.50% -3.64% -2.79%
Total Debt / Total Assets 34.22% 26.62% 13.55%
EBIT / Interest Expense (median) 3.19 4.22 11.23
Total Debt / EBIT (median) 3.77 2.93 1.07
Total Assets 1,782,596 2,616,229 1,331,731
Firm Years 375 357 814
Firms Net Cash 46 40 289
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the categories. Unconstrained firms are considerably more profitable and also have a greater 
ability to pay dividends. The gearing metrics show that the unconstrained firms have much 
lower debt levels, with total debt to total assets at 21% compared to 39% and 31% in the 
distressed and constrained categories. The other gearing metrics, EBIT interest coverage and 
total debt to EBIT, show the same trend across the categories. Panel B for financial surpluses 
shows the same underlying trends, unconstrained firms are considerably more profitable and 
also are able to make higher dividend payments. The absolute size of the financial surplus is 
lower as they are spending more in CAPEX. Like financial deficits the gearing metrics show 
that the unconstrained firms have considerably less leverage with total debt to total assets 
being 14% compared to 34% and 27% for the distressed and constrained categories. In 
summary it appears that the Z-Score categories do a reasonably good job at differentiating 
firms based on their ability to support further debt across a variety of metrics. 
 
We now turn to the results from estimating our pecking order model for different subsamples 
based on the Z-Score debt capacity categories shown in Table 18. The first point to note is 
that the model performs better for the unconstrained category than for both the constrained 
and distressed categories in terms of explanatory power, with an R2 of 0.45. The model 
performs poorly for the distressed firm category with an R2 of just 0.31 and no evidence of 
statistical significance for the quadratic terms. This may seem counterintuitive as distressed 
firms could be expected to have the strongest theoretical justification for a non-linear 
relationship between FDA and TDA. However if we return to the characteristics of firms in 
the distressed category, there was a higher proportion of firms with a financial surplus and the 
average financial deficit was considerably lower than firms in the other two categories. The 
non-linear relationship was most relevant for very large financial deficits which may not be 
as applicable for these firms.  
 
For all of the categories the dummy variables for financial surpluses are insignificant, 
suggesting no difference in financing behavior between financial deficits and surpluses after 
controlling for the size of the deficit. This is the same result as what was found earlier when 
we split the sample by firm size. The constrained firm category pecking order coefficient is 
relatively high at 0.91 and the quadratic term for financial deficits is also relatively large at -
0.35 and significant. For the unconstrained firm category the intercept term is large (0.019) 
and statistically significant, which as mentioned previously in the discussion of the (De Jong, 
39 
 
et al., 2009) results understate the true size of the pecking order coefficient. To use a 
numerical example, the estimated change in total debt for a firm in the unconstrained 
category with a 5% financial deficit would increase debt by 5.2% based on the estimated 
coefficients i.e. more than 100% of the deficit would be funded by debt. So while the 
coefficient is lower than that of the entire sample, the larger intercept term means that for 
smaller deficits firms in the unconstrained category actually use more debt financing. The 
intercept term is only significant for the unconstrained category. 
 
Table 18 – RC Model and Debt Capacity 
 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start of the period. The model is ∆TDt 
= (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDt +(β3 + β4St) FD2t + et  where ∆TDt is change in total debt and the financial deficit is 
defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. 
The categories are based on the preceding year’s Z-score and are categorised as follows; distressed (Z-Score less 
than 1.81), constrained (Z-Score 1.81-2.67) and unconstrained (Z-Score over 2.67). The Z-Scores are generated 
from Altman’s original coefficients, with each ratio being winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. Numbers in 
parentheses are the standard errors. 
  
 
Entire Sample Distressed Firms 
(<1.81) 
Constrained 
Firms (1.81-2.67) 
Unconstrained 
Firms  (>2.67) 
α0 0.012*** 0.018 -0.009 0.019*** 
 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.005) 
 
    
α1 -0.005 -0.008 0.005 -0.011 
 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.017) (0.010) 
 
    
β1 0.698*** 0.515*** 0.913*** 0.659*** 
 
(0.022) (0.083) (0.055) (0.026) 
 
    
β
 2 0.183 0.277 -0.145 0.202 
 
(0.177) (0.401) (0.358) (0.243) 
 
    
β
 3 -0.210*** -0.058 -0.345*** -0.179*** 
 
(0.013) (0.090) (0.028) (0.015) 
 
    
β
 4 1.545** -0.102 2.135 1.558 
 
(0.750) (1.700) (1.377) (1.083) 
Adjusted R2 0.410 0.310 0.383 0.454 
N 3,852 822 796 2,234 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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The next step is to examine how firm size impacts the results after controlling for debt 
capacity. Table 19 shows the results by firm size but only for firms in the unconstrained 
category.  
 
Table 19 – Unconstrained Firms and Firm Size 
 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start of the period. The regression 
model is ∆TDt = (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDt +(β3 + β4St) FD2t + et  where ∆TDt is change in total debt and the 
financial deficit is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. The categories are based on the preceding year’s Z-score and are categorised as follows; 
distressed (Z-Score less than 1.81), constrained (Z-Score 1.81-2.67) and unconstrained (Z-Score over 2.67). The 
Z-Scores are generated from Altman’s original coefficients, with each ratio being winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
level. Firms are categorised as being small (total assets < $500m), medium (total assets $500m - $2b) and large 
(total assets > $2b), total assets are measured in $AUD. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
  
 
Unconstrained 
Firms  (>2.67) 
Small Firms 
(<$500m) 
Medium Firms 
($500m - $2b) 
Large Firms 
(>$2b) 
α0 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.027** -0.021 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) 
 
    
α1 -0.011 -0.015 -0.020 0.032 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.033) 
 
    
β1 0.659*** 0.576*** 0.717*** 1.260*** 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.065) (0.102) 
 
    
β
 2 0.202 -0.014 0.844 -0.320 
 
(0.243) (0.282) (0.550) (0.671) 
 
    
β
 3 -0.179*** -0.176*** -0.067* -0.474*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.037) (0.058) 
 
    
β
 4 1.558 -0.368 5.217** 3.133 
 
(1.083) (1.31) (2.416) (2.563) 
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.428 0.635 0.501 
N 2,234 1,510 462 262 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
* Significant at the 0.1 level 
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The pattern of these results is similar to Table 14 which shows the entire sample split by size 
category. The explanatory power is worst for small firms (R2 of 0.43), and the magnitude of 
the financial deficit coefficient increases with firm size. The intercept and slope dummies (α1 
and β2) are insignificant across all size categories, however the quadratic term dummy 
variable (β4) is strongly positive and significant for medium size firms. There are also 
differences in the magnitude and significance of the intercept terms and across the size 
categories. What is interesting is that the explanatory power increases for all size categories 
and by a similar magnitude. This is particularly true for medium size firms where the model 
actually fits the data quite well and is supportive of pecking order behavior. However the key 
conclusion from these results is that even when adjusting for debt capacity, the model does 
not explain much of the variation in changes in total debt by small firms, which make up the 
bulk of the sample. The reason for the RC model performing worse for small firms does not 
appear to be due to debt capacity. 
 
In summary while the results presented here have similar patterns to what other researchers 
have found. We find that firm size is important and that that estimated pecking order 
equations for small firms have less explanatory power than for large firms. However unlike 
other researchers we cannot conclude that this is due to constraints on debt capacity. Our 
analysis shows that controlling for debt capacity only results in a small improvement in the 
explanatory power of the model and the magnitude of improvement is consistent across the 
firm size categories. The results are still the weakest for small firms. The results from the RC 
model are generally supportive of pecking order behavior. Figure 10 is an illustration of the 
estimated pecking order behavior with the estimated coefficients from our sample (from 
Table 13) and shows clearly that small deficits are mostly filled with debt but that this ratio 
diminishes over the size of the financial deficit, due to negative coefficient on the quadratic 
term. However for the vast majority of observations our results indicate a high proportion of 
the deficit is filled with debt financing. To put these numbers into perspective the estimated 
equation implies that a firm with a 100% financial deficit (a firm that is doubling in size) 
would be financing this deficit with 50% debt and 50% equity, for any deficit less than 100% 
the proportion of debt used is higher. 
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Figure 10. Proportion of the Estimated Change in Debt relative to the Financial Deficit  
 
This graph is based on the results from Table 13 and represents the ratio of estimated TDA values divided by the 
FDA value. The depiction is only for financial deficits and starting from an FDA value of 5%. 
 
The RC model has shown reasonable improvements over the FG and DVV models and shows 
improved results after being adjusted for debt capacity, but the key problem is that 
explanatory power is still low with an R2 value of 0.45 (for the unconstrained debt capacity 
category).  By way of comparison (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) found a financial deficit 
coefficient of 0.79 and an R2 value of 0.75 for their subsample that is the least constrained by 
debt capacity. Their results are similar in magnitude to (De Jong, et al., 2009) who found a 
financial deficit coefficient of 0.81 and an R2 value of 0.78 for their unconstrained debt 
capacity subsample. The magnitude of these differences is also similar to the magnitude in 
differences between the unrestricted and the restricted sample as in Table 7 and the difference 
across size categories found by other researchers. (Frank & Goyal, 2003) estimated a 
coefficient of 0.16 and 0.75 for their smallest and largest firm size categories respectively 
while our estimates were 0.41 and 0.51 i.e. a relatively minor improvement for our sample. 
 
The question now becomes whether the differences in our results can be attributed to the 
methods used or if they are a feature of the sample. While there are subtle differences in the 
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approach that we have taken in several areas, the process is conceptually similar to previous 
work so it is more likely to be due to the sample. There has been very little research done on 
capital structure in the Australian market so it is hard to make comparisons based on other 
studies. However one commonly cited difference between the composition the Australian 
share market in comparison to other markets is the importance of the resources sector. For 
robustness we have analysed the results excluding resource companies, which are presented 
in Table 21. we also have the summary statistics of resource firms in our sample shown in 
Table 20.  
 
Table 20 – Resources Firms Characteristics 
 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial and utility firms removed and a 
minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well as the top and 
bottom 1% of observations. The financial deficit is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt and is scaled by total 
assets at the start of the period. A positive FDt is a financial deficit while a negative FDt is a financial surplus 
 
Panel A – Financial Deficits 
 
 
Panel B – Financial Surpluses 
 
The first point to note is that while from a total assets perspective resource companies are 
very important to the sample the number of resource firms is not excessive. For example 
Non-Resource Firms Resource Firms Entire Sample
CAPEX 17.41% 28.79% 20.04%
Operating Cash Flow 10.57% 12.81% 11.09%
Dividend Payments 4.51% 2.62% 4.07%
Financial Deficit 18.02% 26.10% 19.88%
Change in Total Debt 12.39% 11.42% 12.16%
Total Debt / Total Assets 27.59% 21.35% 26.15%
Total Assets 1,085,330 2,020,913 1,301,577
Cumulative Total Assets 1,924,290,111 1,077,146,416 3,001,436,527
Firm Years 1,773 533 2,306
Non-Resource Firms Resource Firms Entire Sample
CAPEX 1.98% 7.41% 3.22%
Operating Cash Flow 10.38% 17.30% 11.95%
Dividend Payments 3.90% 3.59% 3.83%
Financial Deficit -5.47% -6.11% -5.62%
Change in Total Debt -3.05% -4.60% -3.40%
Total Debt / Total Assets 23.16% 16.19% 21.58%
Total Assets 1,152,094 3,731,465 1,737,708
Cumulative Total Assets 1,376,751,925 1,309,744,163 2,686,496,088
Firm Years 1,195 351 1,546
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there are 884 resource firm year observations which represent 23% of the sample, however 
the cumulative total asset value of the resource firm year observations represent 42% of the 
sample. The pecking order models that are used in this paper scale the financial deficit and 
change in total debt by the preceding years total assets so it is the number of resource 
companies that are important not the asset value. Another consideration is the relative size of 
the two largest Australian resource companies, BHP Billiton and RIO Tinto. These two 
companies alone account for 60% of the cumulative assets for resources firm year 
observations and 25% of the cumulative assets of the entire sample. This is important for 
interpretation of Table 20 as it is heavily influenced by the characteristics of these two firms. 
However the important characteristics of resources firms is that they have higher CAPEX 
regardless of whether they have a financial deficit or surplus and have lower gearing for both 
financial deficits and surpluses.  
 
The results for the RC model for non resource firms shown in Table 21 are fairly similar to 
the total sample. The explanatory power of the model does improve slightly and the financial 
deficit coefficient is higher (0.76 compared to 0.70), but the quadratic term is also more 
negative which offsets the higher pecking order coefficient to some extent. It is unlikely that 
the differences between our findings and other researchers can be attributed to the importance 
of resource firms to the Australian market.  
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Table 21. RC Model and Non Resource Firms 
 
The sample is Australian firms over the time period 1995-2009 with financial, utility and resource firms 
removed and a minimum total asset size of $50m imposed, firms with missing data values are removed as well 
as the top and bottom 1% of observations. All variables are scaled by total assets at the start of the period. The 
model is  ∆TDt = (α0 + α1St) + (β1 + β2St) FDt +(β3 + β4St) FD2t + et  where ∆TDt is change in total and the 
financial deficit is defined as FDt = It + DIVt + ∆Ct - CFOt. St is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if 
FDt<0 or 0 if FDt>=0. The categories are based on the preceding year’s Z-Score and are categorised as follows; 
distressed (Z-Score less than 1.81), constrained (Z-Score 1.81-2.67) and unconstrained (Z-Score over 2.67). The 
Z-scores are generated from Altman’s original coefficients, with each ratio being winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
level. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
  
Non Resource 
Firms (All 
Categories) 
Distressed Non 
Resource Firms 
(<1.81) 
Constrained Non 
Resource Firms 
(1.81-2.67) 
Unconstrained Non 
Resource Firms  
(>2.67) 
α0 0.014*** 0.014 -0.010 0.024*** 
 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006) 
 
    
α1 -0.004 0.001 0.006 -0.012 
 
(0.009) (0.023) (0.021) (0.011) 
 
    
β1 0.760*** 0.662*** 0.947*** 0.691*** 
 
(0.027) (0.101) (0.067) (0.026) 
 
    
β
 2 0.198 0.123 -0.141 0.292 
 
(0.204) (0.472) (0.428) (0.272) 
 
    
β
 3 -0.234*** -0.086 -0.379*** -0.178*** 
 
(0.016) (0.103) (0.036) (0.019) 
 
    
β
 4 2.147** 0.121 3.005 1.972 
 
(0.750) (1.947) (1.644) (1.244) 
Adjusted R2 0.418 0.340 0.360 0.472 
N 2,968 600 611 1,757 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
 
6. A Note on Interpretation  
One of the biggest challenges for research relating to capital structure theory is that of 
interpretation. As mentioned in the introduction and literature review there is substantial 
variation in observed capital structures, which is why it is so important to understand the 
statistical power of empirical tests when making conclusions. One of the key attractions of 
the financial deficit framework that has been used in this paper is its simplicity and ease of 
interpretation. However the key drawback is that it is only a first order test and does not have 
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the power to conclusively differentiate between the pecking order theory and other theories of 
capital structure. It is also does not have the ability to prove that asymmetric information is 
the dominant driver of financing choices. The literature has tended to focus on the size of the 
pecking order coefficient; with the general interpretation being that the closer this is to 1 then 
the stronger the support for the pecking order theory of capital structure. This is true of the 
original work of (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999) but is a more difficult interpretation to 
make after adjusting for the size of the financial deficit and debt capacity. The line between 
the pecking order theory and the static trade-off theory becomes very blurred at this point. 
Other researchers have commented on this problem, for example (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) 
stated that “once consideration of debt capacity is taken explicitly into account in the pecking 
order it becomes more difficult to distinguish it from a dynamic version of the trade-off 
theory with adjustment costs”. 
 
To illustrate the interpretation problems for using a financial deficit model such as the RC 
model we have created a scenario analysis in Table 22. The point of this table is to show the 
similarity in the predictions for firms following the static trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory, particularly when firms are assumed to have debt constraints. As this table hopefully 
demonstrates, after controlling for debt capacity and deficit size there are only two of the 
scenarios where the financial deficit model has the power to distinguish between firms 
following the pecking order theory and those following the static trade-off theory. These are 
the scenarios where the firm has no debt capacity constraints and is facing a financial surplus 
(or a small financial deficit) which are scenarios B & C. Under the pecking order theory these 
firms would be predicted to use the surplus to either reduce debt or create future debt capacity 
(by building up cash balances) while under the static trade-off theory these firms would be 
predicted to increase leverage. If these firms choose not to increase leverage this is a violation 
of the static trade-off theory as these firms are not maximising shareholder value by taking 
advantage of the benefits of debt financing. 
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Table 22. Scenario Analysis of Different Financing Choices 
The table is a analysis of six different scenarios (A-E) showing how firms are react to different investment 
requirements, given different starting levels of debt capacities. The predictions are our interpretations of the 
static trade-off theory and pecking order theory behaviour and our estimates of what coefficients would be 
estimated from financial deficit models. 
 
Scenario A – Unconstrained Debt Capacity Facing a Large Financial Deficit. These 
firms have significant capital expenditure requirements well ahead of internally generated 
funds but low constraints on issuing debt. 
 
Pecking Order Theory – These firms will use as much debt financing as possible but could 
exhaust available capacity and be forced to raise equity. How much equity will depend on the 
size of the deficit and current available debt capacity. 
 
Static Trade-off Theory – The firm will use as much debt financing as possible to increase 
leverage to its target ratio. If the firm reaches its target a combination of debt and equity will 
be used after this point. 
 
Financial deficit models cannot differentiate between the theories, both will result in a 
coefficient below but close to 1 as firms will use both external debt and external equity. 
 
Scenario B – Unconstrained Debt Capacity Facing a Small Financial Deficit or Surplus 
These firms’ capital expenditure requirements can be covered from internally generated funds 
and they will only run a small deficit or surplus.  
 
Pecking Order Theory – The firm should be able to fully cover deficits with external debt 
and there is no reason to use external equity, financial surpluses will be used to retire debt.  
 
Static Trade-off Theory – The firm will increase leverage regardless of whether it is facing 
a deficit or surplus. No reason to use surpluses to retire debt  
 
Financial deficit models can differentiate between the theories; firms following the pecking 
order theory will have a coefficient close to 1 for both deficits and surpluses while trade-off 
firms will have a coefficient greater than 1 for deficits and less than 0 for surpluses. 
 
Scenario C – Unconstrained Debt Capacity Facing a Large Financial Surplus. These 
firms have high cash flow in excess of its investment requirements, and may be divesting 
assets. 
 
Pecking Order Theory – The firm will retire debt first with the surplus but in cases where it 
has no debt (or debt is fully repaid with the size of the surplus) the surplus will be applied to 
either building future debt capacity or possibly returned to shareholders. 
  
Static Trade-off Theory – The firm will use the surplus to return capital to shareholders in a 
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leverage increasing way. May issue debt simultaneously but will not retire debt. 
 
Financial deficit models can differentiate between the two theories, firms following 
pecking order theory will have a coefficient less than 1 but greater than 0, while those 
following trade-off theory will have a coefficient less than 0. 
 
 
Scenario D – Constrained Debt Capacity Facing a Large Financial Deficit. These firms 
have significant capital expenditure requirements well ahead of internally generated funds but 
face capacity constraints on further debt issuance. 
 
Pecking Order Theory – These firms have debt capacity constraints so will most likely use 
significant amounts of equity financing.  
 
Static Trade-off Theory – These firms will be unlikely to issue additional debt, equity 
financing will be used to reduce the leverage ratio back to target. 
 
Financial deficit models cannot differentiate between the two theories, both will have a 
coefficient closer to 0 than 1. 
 
Scenario E – Constrained Debt Capacity Facing a Small Financial Deficit or Surplus. 
These firms’ capital expenditure requirements can be covered from internally generated funds 
and they will only run a small deficit or surplus. These firms face capacity constraints for 
further debt issuance. 
 
Pecking Order Theory – These firms may not be able to fully cover deficits with external 
debt meaning that some external equity may be issued. Surpluses will be fully used to reduce 
debt. 
 
Static Trade-off Theory – The firm will likely use external equity to finance deficits. 
Surpluses will be used to reduce debt. 
 
Financial deficit models cannot differentiate between the two theories, the coefficient will 
be less than 1 for financial deficits but likely to be close to 1 for financial surpluses. 
 
Firm F – Constrained Debt Capacity Facing a Large Financial Surplus. These firms 
have high cash flow in excess of its investment requirements, and may be divesting assets.  
 
Pecking Order Theory – The firm will use the surplus to reduce debt.  
 
Static Trade-off Theory – The firm will use the surplus to reduce debt. 
 
Financial deficit models cannot differentiate between the two theories, both will have a 
coefficient close to 1. 
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Therefore the power of the financial deficit model is somewhat dependent on the makeup of 
the sample. A better test of the pecking order model versus the static trade-off model would 
be to create groups based on replicating scenarios B & C (as it is only by studying these firms 
that we can reject the static trade-off theory). In order to do this we have split the sample into 
groups based on whether the firm is constrained or unconstrained and the size of the financial 
deficit shown which is shown in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Firm Years by Scenario 
This table shows the number of firm years for each of the 6 scenarios explained in Table 22. The constrained 
and unconstrained groups are based on Z-Scores where we have classified firms as being unconstrained if they 
have a Z-Score above 2.67, if the Z-score is below this they are classified as constrained. The large deficit 
category includes all deficits above 5%, the small deficits & small surplus category includes deficits below 5% 
and surpluses above -5% while the large surplus category includes all surpluses below -5%.  
 
 
This table demonstrates that for the majority of the sample the pecking order model cannot 
differentiate between firms following the pecking order theory and those following the static 
trade-off theory, 67% of the sample can be classified under scenarios A, D, E and F. However 
if we just focus just on scenarios B & C we should be able to provide evidence for or against 
the pecking order theory in comparison with the static trade-off theory. 
 
However it is difficult to apply the RC model to a subsample based on firms under just 
scenarios B & C because these scenarios have severely truncated ranges for the independent 
variable. In this case we would be limiting the deficit size to a maximum of 5%. By imposing 
restrictions on the range of the independent variable and not on the dependent variable we 
severely reduce the ability of the model to explain variation in the dependent variable. To 
overcome this problem we have plotted the observations in Figure 11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large Defict Small Deficts & 
Surpluses
Large Surplus
Unconstrained Firms 946 (Scenario A) 993 (Scenario B) 295 (Scenario C)
Constrained Firms 532 (Scenario D) 756 (Scenario E) 330 (Scenario F)
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Figure 11. Relationship between TDA and FDA for Firms under Scenarios B & C 
This graph shows a subsample chosen to replicate scenarios B & C (where we can differentiate between the 
pecking order and static trade-off theory). These are firms that have a Z-Score greater than 2.67 and have a 
financial deficit below 5%, which represents either a small financial deficit or a financial surplus of any size.  
 
 
While there is substantial variation in changes in debt levels there does appear to be a linear 
relationship with coefficient close to 1 for a substantial proportion of the sample. While this 
is not a definitive statement and we cannot draw conclusions about the strength of the 
pecking order model from this graph, it does appear that they are many violations of what 
would be expected if firms were following the static trade-off theory. The graph shows firms 
that are unconstrained in terms of debt capacity facing either a small deficit or a financial 
surplus of any size. Under the static trade-off theory there is no reason why these firms would 
be reducing debt levels. There is no reason for any observations below the horizontal axis in 
Figure 11 but in this sub sample 52% of the observations are. This is evidence against the 
static trade-off theory as more than half of firms are choosing to decrease debt levels when 
they clearly have the ability to increase leverage and take advantage of the ‘benefits’ of debt 
financing.  
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7. Conclusion 
This research has focused on applying and extending financial deficit models to Australian 
data with the goal being to gain a better understanding of how firms choose to finance their 
assets. This is particularly relevant for Australian firms as there has been relatively little 
research into capital structure in this market and the unique characteristics of the market 
make it an interesting comparison with the rest of the world. 
 
The sample consisted of 3,852 firm year observations of ASX listed companies from 1995-
2009 and showed that leverage levels are reasonably stable and conservative in the Australian 
market, with an average total debt to total assets ratio of 24%. Approximately 1/5 of the 
sample was net cash (which means that cash balances exceed total debt) and approximately 
5% of the sample had no debt at all. Firm size had an important impact on leverage levels 
with small firms using relatively less debt, despite having a higher requirement for external 
capital. The deficit size did appear to have an impact on the use of debt, with the sample 
statistics showing that larger financial deficits required proportionately more equity financing 
than smaller deficits. Financial surpluses were smaller in absolute terms (average of -6% 
compared to 20%) and also less common with 60% of the firm years having a financial 
deficit.  
 
Our results differed from those of (Frank & Goyal, 2003) when using their model on our 
sample. We found a higher pecking order coefficient (0.45 compared to 0.28) and greater 
explanatory power with an adjusted R2 value of 0.36 (compared to 0.27). However for the 
restricted sample, where the firms were required to have continuous data over the whole 
sample period, the results were not as strong for our sample. This is quite important as it was 
the strength of the financial deficit model for a restricted sample used by (Shyam-Sunder & 
Myers, 1999) that has provided the impetus for the recent literature on pecking order theory. 
We could not make the same conclusion that the pecking order theory is a good first order 
description of financing choices from our results. 
 
Like (De Jong, et al., 2009) we found significant differences between financial deficits and 
surpluses when applying their model to our sample. However when we extended their model 
by using a quadratic term as in (Lemmon & Zender, 2008) to allow for a non-linear 
relationship between the financial deficit and changes in total debt, these differences were no 
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longer significant. The model that we developed showed that differences between financial 
deficits and surpluses were being generated by a greater proportion of large and very large 
deficits in the sample. Over the majority of the sample (approximately 94%) the relationship 
between the financial deficit and changes in total debt appeared to be reasonably linear (as 
shown in Figure 7) and similar for financial deficits and surpluses. We did find a significant 
negative quadratic term for the financial deficit, which showed that for very large financial 
deficits firms will use relatively more equity. This is consistent with the findings of (Lemmon 
& Zender, 2008). 
 
We used Altman’s Z-Score to control for debt capacity which resulted in a small 
improvement in the strength of our model, increasing the adjusted R2 from 0.41 to 0.45. 
However this improvement was nowhere near the magnitude of improvement found by other 
researchers who have concluded that after adjusting for debt capacity the pecking order 
model does quite well (Agca & Mozumdar, 2007; De Jong, et al., 2009; Lemmon & Zender, 
2008). However we suspect that other methods used to control for debt capacity have resulted 
in an indirect firm size filter, with both credit ratings and static trade-off regressions being 
heavily influenced by firm size. The key advantage of using the Z-Score is that the 
calculations are not influenced directly by firm size. The means it is a better method to 
answer the key questions emerging from the work of (Frank & Goyal, 2003) and (Fama & 
French, 2002) as to the relevance of the pecking order model for small firms, who appear to 
rely heavily on equity financing. Our results suggest that debt capacity is not the answer. We 
found that results for small firms that are relatively unconstrained are only marginally 
improved from small firms that are constrained, and small firms have weaker results relative 
to both medium and large firms regardless of debt capacity constraints.  
  
However it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from financial deficit models such as 
have been used in this paper. Capital structure decisions are dynamic and long term in nature 
while the models are static and short term in nature. This could be one reason why the 
explanatory power is relatively low for our model as the variation in change in debt could be 
based on expectations of future financial deficits rather than the current one. There have been 
dynamic pecking order and trade-off models developed in the literature but these are largely 
theoretical in nature. The way forward for capital structure research could be to further 
examine the persistence and dynamics of financing decisions. Another problem with the 
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results presented here is that of interpretation. We have shown how the financial deficit 
model that allows for a non-linear relationship between the financial deficit and changes in 
total debt, and controls for debt capacity cannot differentiate between the pecking order 
theory and the static trade-off theory. In our sample we estimate that there are only 33% of 
firm year observations where the model can differentiate between the two theories. This casts 
doubt on the interpretations of other researchers; a financial deficit coefficient close to one is 
not necessarily support for the pecking order theory.  
 
In summary the contributions of this research are mostly theoretical in nature as it is difficult 
to draw definitive conclusions from our results.  We did find that debt capacity is not the 
‘silver bullet’ to understanding why small firms use more equity than larger firms. We also 
found that where our model could differentiate between pecking order and static trade-off 
theory, the support for the static trade-off theory was weak. However there is still substantial 
unexplained variation in changes in total debt from our model. It would be interesting to 
examine the differences between the results from our sample and US based studies in more 
depth. If the results that we have found for our sample are reproduced using the same 
methods in other markets it would cast considerable doubt on the conclusions reached by 
others, and would strengthen the criticisms of the validity of the pecking order model for 
small firms.  
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